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Background
The pricing of medicines and health products has become one 
of the most hotly debated topics in health policy—in both 
industrialized/OECD countries and low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs). Creating the right pricing structure for 
pharmaceuticals and health products has become particularly 
important for LMICs, where pharmaceuticals account for a 
signiicant portion of total health expenditure.
Under the historical model for global health, most of the world’s 
poor lived in low-income countries; the global burden of 
disease was largely communicable, and mostly concentrated 
in low- and lower-middle-income countries; and development 
assistance for health inanced large portions of health expendi-
ture in low and lower-middle income countries. This model 
of global health assistance is now passé. The world’s poor 
(and disease burden) are no longer concentrated in low-income 
countries (LICs) but now reside primarily in middle-income 
countries (MICs). And as MICs transition from health assist-
ance, they often face signiicantly higher prices for health 
products compared to the prices received by global health 
mechanisms. This poses a signiicant risk to sustaining the health 
gains achieved in immunization, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), 
malaria, family planning, and other disease areas funded though 
development assistance for health. 
At the same time, other forces are at work. Epidemiological 
transition is shifting the disease burden from infectious to non- 
communicable diseases (NCDs) across most countries, but many 
LMICs still face a high communicable disease burden—espe-
cially in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Economic growth 
and improved iscal space have not necessarily translated into 
commensurate increases in government health spending (Doherty 
et al., 2018; Tandon et al., 2018). The modest increases in 
government expenditure for health are insuficient to sustain 
inancing of health programs previously supported by donors, 
particularly given that countries face higher prices of health 
products. As donor aid shrinks, and government expenditures do 
not increase fast enough to keep pace, a majority of the health 
expenditure in LMICs (especially for medicines/health products) 
is borne out-of-pocket by individuals and families. For some 
transitioning countries, high prices for vaccines, antiretroviral 
therapy (ART) and other products can jeopardize the inancial 
sustainability of health sector budget (Silverman, 2018). When 
faced with the choice between sustaining donor-inanced pro-
grams and making other investments in the health system or 
NCDs, some country governments are inclined to choose the 
latter—leading to tensions between different global agencies and 
country governments that further complicate this issue.
The lack of a clear architecture for pricing and prioritiza-
tion of health products continues to be a major impediment to 
achieving UHC (Schäferhoff et al., 2019; Watkins et al., 2018). 
National health insurance systems—most of which are still 
in stages of infancy in most LMICs—are devoting large por-
tions of their limited budgets to health products (e.g. Ghana’s 
NHIS and Kenya’s NHIF spend between 40–55% of their total 
budgets on health products); this makes it dificult to expand 
quality services to cover more of the population. In tandem, new 
technologies (especially vaccines and diagnostics) are entering 
LMIC health systems at an unprecedented pace. The pressure to 
adopt new health technologies creates signiicant opportunity 
costs and is likely to crowd out more cost effective interven-
tions (e.g. Kenya and GeneXpert (Callaway, 2017; Muchangi, 
2019); Senegal offering free access to trastuzumab, which has in 
turn been shown not be cost-effective in most African settings1 
(Gershon et al., 2019); or the recent listings in the WHO 
Essential Medicines List of expensive products for cancer 
and autoimmune diseases, including erlotinib and adalimu-
mab, with incremental cost effectiveness ratios in the order of 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, in the hope generic versions 
will materialise (Hill et al., 2016; WHO, 2019—page 222); or 
dialysis in LMICs absorbing large chunks of small and strained 
budgets (van der Tol et al., 2019)).
This context requires rethinking the current model of 
pharmaceutical pricing—and, we argue, an important role for 
value-based tiered pricing (VBTP), a system of pricing where 
each country pays a price commensurate with local value. 
In this article we irst describe the review the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the potential beneits and challenges of 
applying tiered pricing schemes in LMICs. We then present 
VBTP as an approach to help manage some of the tensions 
and tradeoffs in the debate around LMIC medicine pricing. 
While VBTP is no magic bullet for universal LMIC access to 
medicines, it holds the potential to move countries forward 
toward UHC.
Theory and evidence on pricing models and 
differential pricing
Overview
Eficient pricing for on-patent pharmaceuticals is complex and 
challenging. Under the current IP model, private companies 
pay upfront for pharmaceutical R&D (though they often beneit 
from public sector investments in basic scientiic research and 
early stage R&D); they later recoup their upfront investments 
and earn proits by selling successful pharmaceutical innovations 
at prices well above marginal cost, protected by term-limited 
patents (Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Drug Discovery, 
Development, and Translation, 2009). If prices are too low, 
pharmaceutical companies will not invest in innovation 
(dynamic ineficiency); if prices are too high, the costs of 
accessing existing therapies will outweigh the beneits (static 
ineficiency). Pricing policy for innovative pharmaceutical 
therefore need to achieve a delicate balance between these twin 
1
 In Brief: Senegal to offer free breast and cervical cancer treatment. 
Uncensored Opinion. Sept 2019. See here: https://uncensoredopinion.co.za/
in-brief-senegal-to-offer-free-breast-and-cervical-cancer-treatment/
      Amendments from Version 1
We thank the reviewer for their comments; we have amended the 
paper including a reference to his review, to address his points. In 
brief, we have added more references as requested, explained/
qualified various statements and pointed to his review for a list of 
challenges in making VBTP a reality.
Any further responses from the reviewers can be found at the 
end of the article
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goals: affordable access to existing treatments on the one hand, 
and potentially transformative and lifesaving innovation on the 
other.
Zooming out from pricing policy in any individual country, 
global pricing for on-patent products becomes even more 
challenging. Pharmaceutical R&D is a global public good; the 
cost is borne through a one-time upfront investment justiied 
by the potential for future sales, and the beneits are potentially 
shared across consumers worldwide. Prices are not determined 
by the costs of R&D; however, the size of investment in 
R&D is determined by the expectations of the global prices 
manufacturers are likely to command for the products in 
development. Since post-hoc sales indirectly fund R&D in this 
way, the choice of pricing policy across countries there-
fore determines how much each country contributes to the 
joint cost of pharmaceutical innovation. (For products that are 
off-patent, market competition has the potential to create the 
right pricing structure—though in practice, market failures 
and barriers to entry often help sustain artiicially high prices 
in LMICs even after patent expiration (Silverman, 2018).
For products under patent and with limited therapeutic sub-
stitutes, price is determined by strategic responses between 
the manufacturer and purchasers in different markets. The 
manufacturer’s goal is to maximize total proits across all 
markets. Each purchaser, in contrast, aims to access the drug 
at the lowest possible price, so long as the beneits at that price 
outweigh the cost of the drug. (For simplicity, the below sec-
tion refers interchangeably to “countries” and “consumers”, 
imagining that each country is served by a single payer able to 
negotiate and purchase on behalf of all citizens using pooled 
funds; in practice, however, most markets are served by a 
heterogenous mix of public payers, private insurers, and 
out-of-pocket expenditure from individuals.)
One possibility would be for the manufacturer to set a uni-
form single price for all countries across the entire world; coun-
tries could choose to either purchase the drug at the uniform 
price or walk away without purchasing the drug. At a very high 
price, the manufacturer knows that only a few countries will be 
willing to pay for the drug and total revenue will be low. At a 
very low price, on the other hand, almost every country will 
be willing to pay for the drug—but total revenue will still be 
low because revenue per-pill will be miniscule and may even 
fall below the marginal cost of production. The optimal price, 
from the perspective of the patent holder, would be somewhere 
in the middle, where the marginal revenue of serving one 
additional country—accounting for both increased volume, 
which increases revenue; but also decreased price across all 
countries, which decreases revenue—is equal to the marginal 
cost of producing the pill. That is, the manufacturer will choose 
the single price for the entire world based on the overall/aggregate 
demand elasticity.
But a single price would create signiicant social dead-weight 
loss (ineficiency). Some countries would be unwilling or una-
ble to buy the drug at the single uniform price; that means some 
markets would not be served at all (Kremer & Snyder, 2018). 
A uniform price would also be suboptimal from the manu-
facturer’s perspective, since it leaves potential revenues 
from unserved markets on the table; therefore, a single price 
would also be ineficient for recouping R&D costs and 
incentivizing future innovation (Danzon, 1997).
Alternatively, a manufacturer could deploy differential pricing 
across multiple heterogenous markets—that is, a manufacturer 
could charge different prices for the same product in differ-
ent countries. Price differences would relect differences in the 
willingness (and ability) of each country to pay for the product. 
(More speciically the manufacturer would charge lower prices to 
price-sensitive countries, and higher prices to less price-sensitive 
countries).
In theory, differential pricing across countries can create welfare 
gains by improving access for patients in developing countries 
without necessarily harming either the proits of the pharmaceu-
tical companies or access for patients in developed countries. 
Under certain conditions, differential pricing may also lead 
to better incentives for pharmaceutical research and develop-
ment, and thus in the long run could beneit patients in both 
developing and developed countries (Danzon & Towse, 2003).
Literature review
Yadav (2010) provides a review of literature on differential pric-
ing. Relevant literature is reviewed below to provide the right 
theoretical background for the rest of this paper.
Price discrimination in a monopoly. Multiple studies 
(Schmalensee, 1981) have shown that differential pricing by 
a single proit-maximizing manufacturer leads to improve-
ments in overall welfare (i.e. beneits both the manufacturer 
and the consumers) if total sales increase as a result of differen-
tial pricing. Similar indings are reported in Varian (1985) and 
Schwartz (1990). Layson (1994) shows that if a monopolis-
tic irm serves two markets—one with higher willingness/ 
ability to pay and larger proit margin, and a second with 
lower willingness/ability to pay but a large market size—price 
discrimination will enhance social welfare. More generally, 
Malueg & Schwartz (1994) show that price discrimination 
increases social welfare when there are large differences in 
demand. Hausman & Mackie-Mason (1988) note that price dis-
crimination is also more likely to increase dynamic welfare by 
better incentivizing research and development.
Price discrimination in an oligopoly. There is very little research 
that examines the impact of price discrimination in an oli-
gopoly (products with a small number of manufacturers, but 
more than one). Using a simpliied model, Fudenberg & Tirole 
(2000) predict that price discrimination among irms in an oli-
gopoly would lead to high initial prices followed by a subsequent 
price reduction; consumers would be better off in aggregate.
When one market is a monopoly and other market is oli-
gopoly. In some cases, a irm could serve two independent mar-
kets—one in which it enjoys a monopoly, and the other in 
which it must compete with a rival irm. The effect of price dis-
crimination in this scenario remains understudied, though this 
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analysis would be important for understanding situations where 
generic competition exists in some countries, but other countries 
remain under patent exclusivity. In this environment, Armstrong 
& Vickers (1993) show that a irm would set a monopoly 
price in the irst market; prices in the second market would 
be determined by the competitive interaction between the two 
irms. If the irm cannot successfully set different prices in 
the two markets due to price regulation or other factors, the 
irm may end up choosing a reduced price in the captive 
market and a raised price in the competitive market.
Under a system of differential pharmaceutical pricing, Mujumdar 
& Pal (2005) show that price regulation in one county has no 
impact on prices charged in a second country. As long as there is 
no price referencing, pricing decisions are made independently 
for each market.
Ramsey pricing. While in theory differential pricing is based 
on price elasticity of customer segments, in practice price 
elasticities of individual customer segments/markets are 
unobservable. As a result, average per capita income is often 
used as a proxy for price elasticity and differential pricing is 
designed around GNI/capita or GDP/capita. While voluntary 
differential pricing by a manufacturer achieves higher social 
welfare compared to charging a single uniform price, the 
absolute price levels charged by a proit-maximizing monopo-
list may not be socially optimal. Ramsey pricing (Ramsey, 1927) 
can be utilized to determine differential prices in each market 
to recoup the variable and joint R&D costs. Ramsey pricing, 
which was originally explored as a pricing approach for pub-
lic utilities with large ixed costs, involves choosing prices 
in each market in inverse relation to the demand elasticities, 
and subject to assuring a speciied target proit level for the 
manufacturer, e.g. a irm’s target internal hurdle rate of return. 
Depending on who sets the target rate of return, Ramsey 
pricing can be more akin to a regulated proit maximizing 
monopolist. Even though Ramsey pricing can be welfare 
eficient, it may not be consistent with the goal of improving 
access to LMICs. Without consensus on what would be the 
socially acceptable rate of return for the manufacturer, the 
selected price differentials often transfer a larger portion of 
surplus to the manufacturer, making it similar to a price 
discriminating monopolist.
Welfare effects in global markets using simulation or empiri-
cal data. Several papers use simulation or empirical data to 
interrogate the welfare effects of price discrimination across 
global pharmaceutical markets. Dumoulin (2001) uses a 
simulation model to compare a single global price with dif-
ferential prices based on country income. The analysis shows 
that differential pricing maximizes both manufacturer proit 
and affordability to the population, increasing access by a fac-
tor of roughly 4–7. Among countries with the same GDP per 
capita, the country in which wealth is most concentrated will 
face a higher price under price discrimination; companies would 
rationally price for the rich segment of society rather than the 
more populous but less lucrative lower-income segment.
Scherer (2004) considers the welfare effects of allowing poor 
countries to access generic versions of medicines protected 
by patents in rich countries. Globally, he inds this would 
increase welfare because the marginal utility of income (the 
beneit derived from one extra unit of currency) is greater in 
poor nations than in rich ones. However, this may lead to negative 
welfare effect in the rich countries.
Danzon (1997) compares the welfare effects of differential pric-
ing for pharmaceuticals in the United States and the European 
Union (EU). They show that prices in the European Union (EU), 
are farther from ‘Ramsey Optimal Prices’ due to paral-
lel trade and monopsony buying structure. Danzon & Chao 
(2000) compared the prices of a limited sample of drugs across 
countries and conclude that prices for generics are lower in 
markets without price regulation.
Hellerstein et al., (2004) examine differential pricing for ARVs 
for HIV/AIDS and show that until 2000 there was little varia-
tion in the prices of ARVs between the high and low-income 
countries.
Reich & Bery (2005) discuss differential pricing among vari-
ous options of improve access to AIDS medicines. They list 
three possible mechanisms for a differential pricing system: 
internal company polic- based differential pricing, international 
agency facilitated differential pricing and wider distribution 
of price information to different actors.
Lopert et al. (2002) recommend a mechanism of setting prices 
in each country based on the incremental cost per life-year 
gained for each country based on its per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) as a proxy for a patient’s ability to pay.
Based on an extensive literature search, Lang & Hill (2004) 
conclude that differential pricing can lead to improved 
access for low-income countries, increased market share for 
companies, and no price increases for high-income countries.
Summary. Compared to a single price across countries, the lit-
erature clearly demonstrates that differential pricing enhances 
both static and dynamic eficiency. The debate, therefore, is 
not about the value of differential pricing per se but rather 
how differential pricing should be structured; how it should 
distribute surplus between the manufacturer and buyer(s); 
and, relatedly, how it should trade off between dynamic and static 
eficiency. Traditional price discrimination allows the manu-
facturer to capture a larger portion of the economic surplus, 
therefore privileging R&D investment (dynamic eficiency); 
Ramsey-style pricing, in contrast, could in theory transfer 
most of the surplus to consumers and regulate proits, therefore 
privileging affordable access to existing therapies (static 
eficiency).
Challenges in conventional differential pricing
The theoretical beneits of differential pricing can only be 
met under speciic conditions. Manufacturers must be able 
to securely separate economic markets based on demand 
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elasticity—preventing either physical or informational leakage 
between markets and using the right proxies for demand elasticity 
in each.
In LMICs, these conditions are rarely met in practice (Yadav, 
2010). Many LMICs have highly skewed income distributions, 
making it more lucrative to cater to richer segments of society 
than the more voluminous poorer classes (oftentimes includ-
ing large migrant/undocumented populations from neighbour-
ing countries).  This is exacerbated by relatively low levels 
of pooling; most purchase decisions, in practice, are made by 
individuals, who are likely to be more price sensitive than a 
pooled payer. Manufacturers are also wary of physical arbitrage 
(e.g. reimportation to higher value markets) and informational 
arbitrage (e.g. lower LMIC prices used to inform pricing in higher 
value markets via external reference pricing). Drug resistance 
and supply/manufacturing constraints may also create impedi-
ments for serving more price-sensitive consumers (Yadav, 2010). 
In addition, while overall welfare may be higher, tiered pricing 
may allow producers to charge a margin which is far higher than 
the amount needed to recoup R&D investments and production 
costs (Moon et al., 2011).
To achieve welfare enhancing prices, some argue that the monop-
oly pricing power of a manufacturer must be constrained by 
regulatory price controls or through competition (via compul-
sory licensing). This may achieve static eficiency gains, but 
the resulting effect on dynamic eficiency could be problematic.
See Table 1 below for a description of the three main product 
characteristics to consider for the applicability of differential 
pricing.
Differential pricing and procurement architecture
Real-world transactions, including manufacturer price-setting, 
are often more complex than basic economic theory would 
predict. When a single manufacturer sells to multiple mar-
kets, the manufacturer considers not just price elasticity of 
the market but also the purchaser’s buying power, as well as 
other factors such as payment timeliness, long-term customer 
value, and transaction costs. Smaller country purchasers 
are then at a natural disadvantage; the volume they are pur-
chasing is too small to create negotiating leverage based on 
market power, and the transaction costs are high relative to a 
manufacturers’ total potential revenue.
One option used to increase small countries’ purchasing power 
and reduce transaction costs is pooled or joint procurement. 
Pooled procurement has been deployed, for example, via the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) pooled procurement mecha-
nism, the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) Revolving 
Fund for Vaccines, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States (OECS), and the African Island States procurement 
service, both for single source/on-patent drugs and generics. 
Such arrangements can only work if participating countries have 
comparable income levels and/or willingness to pay, since a 
single price is set across participating countries.
Table 1. Product and market characteristics for applicability of differential pricing.
Differential pricing can only create welfare gains for certain product and market types. There are three main product 
characteristics to consider for the applicability of differential pricing:
    1. Product life cycle:
    ฀°   Established products with dozens of generic manufacturers do not require differential pricing; the forces of market 
competition are the best lever to achieve optimal prices.
    ฀°   New health technologies which are currently being launched in HICs may be a good candidate for differential pricing, 
allowing simultaneous (versus delayed) market launch in LMICs.
    ฀°   On-patent products that have already been launched in LMICs through donor-led procurement—e.g. new ARVs or 
vaccines—could also be good candidates for differential pricing
    2. Production cost and economies of  scale:
    ฀°   Production of biologics and vaccines requires significant capital investments to set up manufacturing plants; their 
production cost curves are steep downward sloping. 
    ฀°   This implies that differential pricing can enhance economies of scale for one (or a few) manufacturers, allowing lower 
prices at the lowest tier.
    ฀°   In the long run, however, differential pricing (and the subsequent higher prices) could create barriers to entry/
competition; new manufacturers may not be able to achieve the economies of scale enjoyed by the one or two large 
incumbent manufacturers.
    3. Complexity in administering the product:
    ฀°   As discussed earlier, the welfare-enhancing properties of differential pricing only apply when differential pricing leads 
to higher overall sales for manufacturers—that is, when lower prices lead to a higher sales volume. For products that 
require more sophisticated health system infrastructure to administer, a lower price may not necessarily lead to a 
substantial increase in sales volume. Differential pricing may not be the best approach for such products unless health 
system infrastructure is improved in parallel.
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Monopsony power of large buyers carries some risks and can 
lead to unintended consequences. For example, if pooled monop-
sonist purchasers with high income heterogeneity between 
participating countries use their buying power to exercise lowest 
price clauses in their price negotiations, it can lead to decreases 
in welfare (Privett & Yadav, 2012). A large pooled purchaser 
which has a combination of low-, middle- and high-income 
countries in its pool can leverage its buying power to demand 
low prices for all its members, including middle- and high-
income countries. Strategic pricing response from manufacturer 
to the presence of such a buyer reduced overall welfare in 
the system. 
Value-based tiered pricing
In economic theory, true differential pricing should relect 
each market’s willingness to pay. In contrast, conventional 
differential (tiered) pricing used in global health (e.g. for 
vaccines, ARVs, malaria medicines, and contraceptives 
(Yadav, 2010) has primarily used per capita income as a proxy 
for willingness to pay. The use of GDP per capita as a crude 
proxy for willingness to pay is a signiicant law in the design 
of differential pricing programs, driving contention and debate. 
The highly skewed income distribution in countries such as 
Brazil, India, and Thailand leads to discontent with prices 
offered based on national average GNI/capita (Yadav, 2010).
A different approach—value-based (beneit-based) tiered pric-
ing (VBTP)—has the potential to address previously observed 
challenges with conventional differential pricing (Danzon 
et al., 2015). Under VBTP, prices in each country should be 
based on a health system’s willingness to pay, where willingness 
to pay relects the actual, assessed value of the product 
within that market/health system (‘value-based pricing’) account-
ing for affordability and budgetary constraints (See Figure 1) 
(Claxton, 2007). The assessed value of a product is based 
on three factors. First, how much additional health will the 
product create (compared to the current standard of care or 
potential comparator products)? Second, what are the net 
additional costs to the health care system of adoption, includ-
ing how may decrease or increase health spending elsewhere? 
(For example, a vaccine would prevent disease, which a health 
system would otherwise need to pay to treat; but a new medi-
cal device would also require implantation or surgical costs 
in addition to the procurement price of the product.) Finally, 
how much is the health system willing and able to pay for 
additional health beneits offered (e.g. per disability- or 
quality-adjusted life years)?
Determining value…locally
Use of value assessment to inform pricing decisions is already 
supported by a substantial research and institutional infra-
structure. Many LMICs are already using or exploring value 
assessment (through health technology assessment) to inform 
their procurement/price negotiation and reimbursement deci-
sions, including Thailand, China, India, Ghana, South Africa, 
the Philippines, Indonesia, Brazil Mexico, Colombia, Kenya 
and Tanzania (Government launches health technology 
assessment to inform policy decision making Nairobi, (n.d.); 
Hollingworth et al., 2019; MacQuilkan et al., 2018; Surgey 
et al., 2019; Tantivess et al., 2017). There is also a large body of 
literature around how to estimate a health system’s willingness 
and ability to pay for health gains.
Figure 1. Sequence of actions for value-based tiered pricing.
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The key question is what improvement in health would be pos-
sible if the additional (net) resources required had, instead, 
been made available for other health care activities. This 
assessment of health opportunity cost is relevant whether 
the additional costs of the investment must be found from 
existing commitments and current levels of health expenditure, 
or when health expenditure can/will be increased to 
accommodate the additional resources required. Therefore, 
the problem of establishing how much a health care system 
should be willing and able to pay for the beneits of a product 
is the same as estimating the relationship between changes in 
health care expenditure and health outcomes. Countries vary in 
disease burden, demographics, health expenditure and system 
structure. As a consequence the marginal productivity 
of health care expenditure, health opportunity costs, and how 
much health care systems can afford to pay for the health ben-
eits of products are likely to be correlated with income levels; 
however, GDP per capita, by itself, will not precisely predict 
optimal pricing.
Estimates of the marginal productivity of health expenditure 
in producing health (quality-adjusted life-years) are becoming 
available for some high-income countries based on approaches 
to estimation which exploit within-country data, (Claxton 
et al., 2015; Edney et al., 2018; Lomas et al., 2018; Martin 
et al., 2008; Vallejo-Torres et al., 2018). This evidence from 
high-income settings can be used to give some indication 
of possible values in lower income countries (Woods et al., 
2016) based on a number of assumptions about income elas-
ticity of demand for health and the relative ‘under funding’ 
of health care systems.
The effect of different levels of health care expenditure on 
mortality outcomes has been investigated in a number of 
published studies using country level data, many including 
LMICs (Gallet & Doucouliagos, 2017). The challenge is to 
control for all the other reasons why mortality might differ 
between countries in order to isolate the causal effect of 
differences in health expenditure. A number of studies try 
and overcome this problem and estimate outcome elasticities 
for all cause adult and child mortality, by gender, as well as 
survival, disability and DALYs (Bokhari et al., 2007; Ochalek 
et al., 2018). These estimated elasticities have been used to 
provide country speciic estimates of health opportunity costs 
(cost per DALY averted) for 97 LMICs, taking account of 
measures of a country’s infrastructure, donor funding, popula-
tion distribution, mortality rates, conditional life expectancies 
(all by age and gender), estimates of disability burden of 
disease and total health care expenditure (Haasis et al., 2015). 
These types of estimates suggest that optimal prices under 
VBTP will vary across countries and as a general trend increase 
with increasing GDP per capita, but speciic pricing in each 
country would depend on how much health would be produced 
in that system, the speciic cost structure of the health system, 
and how a country values health gains achieved through a health 
technology. 
VBTP therefore offers an opportunity to improve upon con-
ventional tiered pricing and sustainably capture the potential 
eficiency gains from differential pricing, particularly in coun-
tries which are moving towards high coverage in their national 
insurance programs and are already using value-based pricing 
and cost-effectiveness thresholds. Value assessment provides a 
more accurate measure of a country’s willingness to pay than 
use of GDP per capita, which is likely to be correlated with 
willingness to pay but offers only a crude, often imprecise 
proxy. Deinitionally, VBTP also ensures that a product would 
be locally affordable, as the value assessment explicitly 
considers a country’s willingness to pay for health gain, 
which is directly linked to its ability to pay for health gain, given 
resource constraints. 
“What’s in it for me?” Benefits of VBTP for different actors 
in the health system
Below we describe how a functional VBTP system would ben-
eit different actors within LMIC health systems. As described 
in the previous section, our deinition of “value” is always 
based on beneits that accrue to the payer and the payer’s 
willingness to pay for these beneits.
Health care systems in low- and middle-income markets. 
A VBTP system would dramatically increase the accessibil-
ity and affordability of health innovation in LMICs. VBTP 
would ensure that transaction prices are affordable, relect local 
opportunity costs, and therefore remove the politically difi-
cult choice between restricting access to effective medicines 
or allowing access at too high a price, thereby damaging other 
parts of the health care system and the economy. By using 
the beneits-based price as the starting point/ceiling price in 
negotiations with industry, country payers can ease budget 
pressure, making collective or universal coverage more politi-
cally and inancially sustainable. In particular, VBTP can help 
relieve budget pressure within the MICs currently setting up 
insurance or universal health coverage schemes and payer agen-
cies, especially when existing health technology assessment 
infrastructure is already driving listing decisions and price 
negotiations.
In the absence of tiered pricing (e.g. at a single global price), 
most MICs would be priced out of the market for innovative 
pharmaceuticals, except perhaps among a handful of wealthy 
individuals willing and able to pay out of pocket. In contrast, 
prices that relect the budgetary constraint can help drive 
appropriate and equitable uptake of branded pharmaceuticals, 
provided arrangements are in place to adjust the value-based 
price downwards2 in situations where adoption would lead to 
signiicant budget impacts (e.g. introduction of PCV in 
the Philippines (Ochalek et al., 2018); or HepC drugs in 
Australia). Appropriate VBTP implies that a country payer can 
afford to purchase an innovative product for the entire covered 
population in need—avoiding inequities caused by rationing 
either on an ad hoc basis or based on individuals’ ability to pay 
2
 See (Lomas et al., 2018) for a discussion of non-marginal effects, 
though applying such adjustments in real time may be impractical in 
many MICs systems.
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out-of-pocket. Likewise, differential pricing across countries 
implies that a greater number of countries could afford health 
innovation—reducing cross-country inequities of access and 
health outcomes (though better outcomes for many NCDs 
such as cancer or diabetes also require signiicant expendi-
ture and capacity elsewhere in the health system, e.g. cancer 
outcomes depend on early diagnosis, access to radiotherapy, and 
surgery etc.).
Likewise, a global system of VBTP would help signal 
LMIC health needs and demand to product developers, 
creating at least some inluence on commercial research and 
development decisions (to a signiicant extent compared to 
single global price3). Private sources invest over $170 billion 
each year in healthcare R&D; over time, consistent demand 
signaling from LMICs should direct at least some of these 
resources toward LMICs’ speciic health needs. The strength 
of this signal will grow smoothly and progressively with 
economic growth rather than the ‘binary’ effect of a single 
global price. Further, as MICs invest in their own healthcare 
product industries, a VBTP system could expand the size of 
domestic and global pharmaceutical markets. The Chinese 
government, for example, is already emphasizing R&D 
(including biosimilars and increasingly “innovative” products) 
within the Chinese pharmaceutical industry with the government 
emphasis on R&D including biosimilars.
Importantly, such an R&D system is still likely to underserve 
low-income countries (LICs), which are shrinking in number 
and population but continue to represent a substantial portion 
of the global disease burden. LICs are likely to have differ-
ent innovation needs than MICs (e.g. treatment/prevention 
for neglected tropical diseases or products that can be deliv-
ered without cold chains), extremely limited ability to pay for 
innovation, and continued reliance on donor funding and 
procurement support. However, a VBTP could still beneit LICs 
by improving access to existing products with a shared burden 
across LICs and MICs/high-income countries (HICs)—so long 
as the LIC value-based price still exceeds the manufacturers’ 
marginal cost of production.
More broadly, in situations where the value- or beneit-based 
price an LMIC is less than the manufacturer’s marginal cost 
of production, the manufacturer will still have no commercial 
incentive to offer the product for sale, even under a system 
of perfect global price discrimination. This scenario may be 
quite common in LICs, where evidence-based, budget-sensitive 
thresholds are likely to be much lower than those used by 
global partners (or formerly by WHO) and even small 
molecules may be too costly at marginal-cost prices (Chalkidou 
& Keller, 2017). Further, the production costs of new biologics 
(and biosimilars) remain very high also requiring signiicant 
upfront investment costs in manufacturing plants (unlike small 
molecule generics). In addition, the total cost of serving an addi-
tional market also includes the costs associated with regula-
tory approval, product launch, and safe delivery in the context 
of care pathways and with associated systems—which may be 
cost-ineffective, given competing priorities and limited budgets, 
in many LICs and some MICs. So, while a VBTP system 
should improve access to some portion of innovative health 
products in at least some markets, perfect price discrimination 
alone will not, unfortunately, lead to full access for all branded 
drugs in all contexts.
Industry. VBDP would increase industry’s revenue and proit 
for a product during patent protection. Pricing (and volumes) in 
each country would be based on evidence of a product’s value 
proposition—a rational and therefore accountable assessment 
for each health system. A VBTP system would be more 
predictable than current arrangements, where regulatory approval 
is disconnected from listing decisions and listing decisions 
themselves offer little information on the likely extent of take 
by the health system. As such, price discrimination reduces 
unnecessary risks while maintaining companies’ incentives to 
develop better products, as more effective drugs will predictably 
increase revenue while an ineffective or dangerous product would 
yield no revenue at all.
It is theoretically possible that perfect VBTP across systems 
would lead to lower revenue than the status quo for some prod-
ucts. If this is the case, however, this implies that some coun-
tries are presently overpaying for pharmaceuticals relative to 
the opportunity cost; this means current revenues are likely 
to be unsustainable in the medium-term regardless as they 
would be unsustainable for the healthcare system. Indeed, 
VBTP is by design sustainable, as healthcare payers will be 
able, deinitionally, to afford access at price offered in their 
setting. This may help reduce the likelihood that national 
payers adopt more drastic policy responses to address 
unaffordable pharmaceutical prices, which may include:
a.    Arbitrary regulatory, evidential, and budgetary barriers to 
entry which prevent market access and increase development 
costs
b.    Competitive tendering or other all-or-nothing aggressive price 
negotiation tactics by monopsonists.
c.    Complete abandonment of patents as products are 
unaffordable (e.g. through compulsory licensing). 
The clear demand signals from MICs (see previous sec-
tion) would also create additional commercial opportunities 
for innovator companies to serve MIC health needs, widening 
the pipeline of products and disease areas as the healthcare 
industry gradually shifts focus to fast-growing emerging markets.
Global agencies and development partners.
•   Better targeting of non-commercial R&D investment
In the context of the aid transition, there is growing concern that 
available resources for assistance are being spent on wealthier 
3
 See Kremer & Snyder, 2018 in reference list for a modelled assess-
ment if the implications of a price discrimination ban and hence the 
imposition of single global price on the price (and access) of HIV drugs.
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countries as opposed to the poorest ones in need (e.g. see lat-
est analysis on EU aid (Morton et al., 2018)). Aid should not be 
used to purchase products at unnecessarily high prices in 
situations where price discriminate could enhance access to needed 
medicines at locally affordable prices. Development partner 
subsidies should instead be devoted to the poorest countries, 
who cannot afford basic health products even at marginal cost, 
and real sources of market failure where global public goods are 
needed, for example R&D targeting the poorest nations. While 
continued aid will still be needed to fund R&D when a market’s 
commercial proposition remains unattractive, VBTP would 
make some R&D investment commercially viable; commercial 
viability would also increase so with expectations of economic 
growth across LMICs. In turn, agencies, donors and founda-
tions could focus their investments where there is insuficient 
commercial incentive for market forces to be effective.
•   More eficient development partner commodity portfolio
Similarly, publicly funded conduits, such as the Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund), 
can use VBTP calculations to guide their own investment 
portfolios (Grubert, 2019; Isabelle et al., 2017). With more 
than half of the Global Fund’s $14 billion budget going to 
commodities (many of which remain on-patent), the lack of a 
mechanism for ex ante value assessment risks compromising 
value-for-money VFM and setting unaffordable pricing prec-
edents price that cannot be sustained following aid transition4. 
Similarly, other global players such as CHAI and UNITAID 
can use value-based assessments to negotiate market shap-
ing deals, (i.e. for dolutegravir) and advise on post-transition 
listing/procurement decisions.
•   Value-informed market shaping
Where donors still play a role in market shaping, VBTP can 
address the current lack of consideration for products’ comparative 
clinical value or global/national affordability. Initiatives such 
as MedAccess, which helps manage the risk of new product 
launches in LMICs, can use VBPT to anchor price negotiations 
with manufacturers, helping ensure better value for the HIC 
taxpayers which inancially support MedAccess and helping signal 
appropriate country-by-country price points for co-inancing.
•   Affordable and predictable LMIC government co-inancing 
during aid transition
A VBTP system could be used in tandem with aid, especially in 
the context of aid transition. Development partners are impos-
ing increasing requirements LMICs to take on part or all of 
the cost for select products. VBTP can help inform decisions 
about the appropriate price point for country co-inancing 
of donor-funded products; for example, LMICs could be asked 
to pay up to the locally-affordable value-based price, while 
donors pay the remainder of the purchase price (Claxton, 2007; 
Claxton et al., 2011).
•   Pooled purchasing arrangements for speciic product types
VBTP, with each country paying prices commensurate with 
local value, can form the basis of multinational, cross-country 
pooled purchasing agreements for certain types of products suf-
fering from speciic market failures, including unpredictable 
demand or onerous country-by-country launch requirements 
(e.g. cancer drugs, biosimilars, and insulin products). Such 
arrangements already work in HIC settings, where countries 
are forming buyer coalitions for horizon scanning, joint price 
negotiations, and procurement deals (PMPRB, 2019). Such 
arrangements could be organized by LMICs themselves or with 
support from development partners.
In summary, VBTP can improve the value-for-money of health 
aid, beneiting both HIC taxpayers and aid beneiciaries, 
including LMIC governments.
Pre-requisites for VBTP
For a global VBTP to work in practice, several preconditions 
must be in place—some of which are not yet fully operational 
in many LMICs:
•    A functional regulatory system trusted by consumers and 
professionals;
•    Purchasing/reimbursement and price negotiation arrange-
ments through a national or subnational payer able signal 
willingness to pay based on budgetary constraints; and
•    A functional healthcare system through which the population 
can consistently access procured health products.
In addition, VBTP would be most effective when comple-
mented by the following conditions, which would allow for 
healthy market competition:
•    A competitive, quality-assured generics market, resulting in 
signiicant price reductions in following patent expiry;
•    Acceptance of the current patent system for most prod-
ucts (with possible exceptions for antimicrobials, and other 
speciic cases) and with modest modiications to prevent 
abuses observed under the status quo (e.g. to remove practices 
such as evergreening).
Potential challenges
Countries with large out-of-pocket markets. The VBTP 
approach would work well in countries where a single or 
handful or purchaser/payers make reimbursement decisions 
for the entire population. But despite progress, most LMICS 
still lack insurance coverage for a majority of the population; 
most still purchase medicines out of pocket. The demand curves 
for individual patients’ out-of-pocket demand are very from 
population level willingness to pay, making it harder to 
implement any form of VBTP, especially as the poorest and 
sickest individuals tend to be the most price sensitive.
External reference pricing. One major obstacle to a global 
VBTP system is the risk posed by external reference pricing, 
4
 See here for Kenya’s recently announced commitment to take on the 
funding of GeneXpert, a POC diagnostic introduced and inanced so fat by 
GFATM. It is not clear what price the government of Kenya will pay for the 
machine or the cartridges.
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where some countries or payers benchmark the prices that they 
are willing to pay to the prices paid by other countries or pay-
ers. Such a system may achieve short-term price reductions 
for individual payers, but in the long run external reference 
pricing leads prices to converge towards a single global 
price—likely close to the current high prices observed in the 
United States due to the and pull of the American market 
(see theory section for further discussion of this phenomenon).
To address this challenge, any individual healthcare system 
could adopt a value-based pricing and price negotiation mecha-
nism with conidential rebates—some of which are already in 
use. The United Kingdom’s National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence (NICE), for example, negotiates conidential 
rebates with manufacturers to maintain a distinction between 
the observed price paid and the true net transaction price for 
the NHS. However, since conidential discounts are applied 
to each individual technology NICE assesses, it is still techni-
cally possible (though hardly straightforward) to identify the 
transaction price for each product, and for that price then to 
be referenced in other systems. Though this is rarely or never 
done in practice under the current international pricing sys-
tem, expansion of VBTP to other large markets might create 
additional incentive to uncover the conidential prices achieved by 
other payers.
As an alternative to avoid some of these issues, one could 
envisage a two-way value-based rebate. This system would 
include a minimum volume/revenue guarantee offered to the 
manufacturer, and a maximum cost guarantee offered to the 
payer at the national (or international, in the case of a cross 
country pooled procurement mechanism) level. This would 
make it harder to identify transaction prices for speciic 
products. The English NHS has applied this mechanism 
(where English regions could emulate national or subnational 
payers participating in an international value-based pooled 
procurement approach) (Nemzoff et al., 2019); see also Canada 
and its provinces where VBP has recently become law (Syam, 
2014).
Free riding and other challenges. As long as some coun-
tries remain outside a VBTP system, there remain incentives 
for some purchasers to free ride by selectively referencing 
lower prices from other systems. Importantly, this is not just 
a problem for VBTP, but applies to any pricing model besides a 
uniform single price.
One way of addressing this challenge would be an interna-
tional commitment to prevent parallel trade and/or external 
reference pricing, potentially administered and enforced 
through the WTP. However, arriving at such an agreement would 
be politically dificult; as just one example, the protection of 
parallel trade between EU states is enshrined in EU law). Even 
if this initial barrier could be overcome, further challenges 
would arise related to monitoring and enforcement; agreeing 
on and implementing a mechanism to calculate value-based 
prices in each healthcare system (e.g. capacity and technical 
constraints or gaming); and ensuring that real transaction prices 
remain dificult to detect.
Although the dificulties are considerable, the potential gains 
are large. And despite national and EU legislation, pooled 
procurement and joint price negotiation (with different prices 
per country) are already taking place through country 
coalitions such as BeNeLuXa for select products. Further, the 
current political appetite in the US to reduce prices can make 
VBTP—which would likely result in lower than current price in 
the US—a politically viable option.
What if a global agreement is not possible? Starting with 
NCDs or products affected by aid transition? An alternative 
starting point would include LMICs and development partners 
with a particular focus on one or more speciic diseases 
(e.g. NCDs such as cancer and diabetes, or TB/malaria/HIV), 
products (e.g. vaccines, family planning commodities), or 
populations (e.g. displaced populations/refugees). Both countries 
and development partners have experimented with pooling 
procurement (e.g. see (Jack, 2019) and references therein for an 
overview; and (Wilkinson et al., 2016) for the EAC experience). 
However, neither donors nor national governments in LMICs 
have seriously considered combining such pooling together 
with some form of differential pricing.
In the case of development partners, the Global Fund and 
Gavi have periodically considered price discrimination but 
abandoned it, in part due to technical and informational 
challenges and in part due to political pressure from disease and 
access to medicines advocates who iercely (and correctly, in 
our view) oppose a model of value-based pricing dictated by 
the healthcare products industry5. The Global Fund’s Pooled 
Procurement Mechanism, StopTB’s Global Drug Facility, and 
UNICEF’s Supply Division are examples of pooled procure-
ment—but they too tend to secure a single price across the 
countries on behalf of whom they buy, sometimes as a delib-
erate policy decision (though in some cases only speciic 
countries, e.g. Gavi-eligible or transitioning countries, may 
be eligible for speciic UNICEF vaccine prices). Market shap-
ing efforts and volume guarantees do not consider incremen-
tal beneit-related value (other than price minimization through 
higher volumes) from the perspective of the purchaser or the 
end beneiciary. Instead the emphasis has traditionally been on 
volume guarantees (Lomas et al., 2018) and underwriting the 
risk of shortfalls or delays in payment.
Countries have also tended to join forces for achieving a sin-
gle price, with PAHO’s revolving fund for vaccines and the 
more recent strategic fund for NCDs and Hep C being cases 
in point. There again the fund insists on a single price across 
all participating countries. A similar approach for NCD 
products through PAHO’s strategic fund has proven less 
successful.
We posit that insistence on a single price, delinked from 
payers’ incremental value, is no longer sustainable. Instead, 
in the context of aid transition, expanding UHC, and growth 
5
 Indeed advocacy groups such as MSF and Oxfam are keener on pooling 
patents instead—but the two approaches are not mutually exclusive.
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of emerging markets’ purchasing model, pooled procurement 
coupled with VBTP becomes a viable proposition.
In this case, a single product-speciic purchaser represent-
ing a block of country payers would commit to purchasing 
the appropriate total volume at the average value-based 
(beneit-based) price—that is, the weighted average of VBPs 
across participating payers). For manufacturers, this would be 
equivalent to a situation of perfect price discrimination across 
the participating countries (or states/provinces in the case of 
large and diverse federal countries such as India and China). 
Each payer would then purchase at their particular value-based 
price from the single global purchaser. Existing mechanisms 
of underwriting payment risk, especially for poorer purchas-
ers, could still apply as needed; however, country purchasers 
would play a major role in product selection and in assessing 
local value.
Where do we start? No such single purchaser exists, but the 
Global Fund already purchases on behalf of most low- and 
middle-income countries for speciic products. An endorsement 
of Health Technology Assessment by the routinely carried out 
by HICs and successful MIC health systems such Thailand 
and China, would allow it to assess value for each product 
across participating countries, ideally using accepted stand-
ards such as the iDSI Reference case, to inform country-speciic 
prices (Lomas et al., 2018). Gavi could also play a similar role. 
This approach would beneit transitioning countries while 
also improving donors’ value for money and rationalizing 
co-inancing requirements for beneiciary countries. 
Of course, the Global Fund, Gavi, and other speciic donor 
institutions only cover limited disease areas. One might envi-
sion a similar approach for cancer drugs (e.g. biosimilars 
or biologics), autoimmune conditions, or diabetes products. 
Such pooling and VBTP would only work for products that 
are not commoditized (generics); in the latter case, differ-
ent arrangements to increase the competitiveness of generics 
markets would be needed and VBTP would add little value.
A research and action agenda
What we propose is not an easy solution but a necessary step 
to progress the discussions regarding innovation and access to 
products in emerging economies. One of our reviewers highlights 
a series of challenges in making VBTP a reality.
Further research is required to scope out the viability of a global 
VBTP mechanism, its welfare impact and its distributional 
consequences. The future research agenda might include themes 
such as an analysis and evaluation of possible mechanisms 
and institutions; or applying game theory to understand the 
dynamic interactions between different actors in the healthcare 
system and consequent welfare effects. Important research 
questions include:
฀•฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀What are the beneits and drawbacks of alternative 
mechanisms/institutional options?
฀•฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀What is scale of potential value that different stakehold-
ers could achieve through a functional VBTP mecha-
nism? How large is this value relative to total current 
revenue or current health? Such an assessment would 
inform the appropriate effort (in time, resources, 
and political capital) that could be spent to achieve a 
workable VBTP process.
฀•฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀How motivated would different players be to participate 
in this system? What could be done to better motivate 
players who would have less to gain?
Additional empirical research will be needed to address 
questions central to making a VBTP mechanism work, such as:
฀•฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀Shortlist of appropriate products for applying the VBTP 
mechanism and appropriate payers to join.
฀•฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀Assessment of evidence-informed prices and volumes.
฀•฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀Assessment of health effects and system costs across 
the range of population subgroups that could beneit 
from a selected product (drawing on the iDSI Reference 
Case).
฀•฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀Designing/agreeing/establishing an accountable proc-
ess for coming to scientiic value judgments about what 
the evidence and analysis suggests (drawing on the 
work of iDSI, DCP and others as well as national payers 
such as NICE, NIPH and HITAP).
฀•฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀An estimate of thresholds relevant to each healthcare 
system, ideally distinguishing the effects of changes 
in public and private spend (plus their interaction with 
GDP per capita, drawing on previous work).
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